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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Randal Graham ("R. Graham") and David Graham ("D. Graham")(collectively the 
"Defendants") hereby adopt the statement of jurisdiction of Ted Duke ("Duke") and 
Maria Del Carmen Savala Cardenas ("Cardenas")(collectively the "Plaintiffs"). (Br. at 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court err in confirming an arbitration award where the standard 
of review of an arbitrator's award is an extremely narrow one giving considerable leeway 
to the arbitrator and setting aside the arbitrator's decision only in certain narrow 
circumstances, none of which were present in this case? 
In reviewing a trial court's order confirming, vacating, or modifying an arbitration 
award, this Court grants no deference to the court's conclusions of law, reviewing them 
for correctness. This Court reviews the district court's findings of fact under the clearly 
erroneous standard. Softsolutions, Inc. v. Brigham Young Univ.. 1 P.3d 1095, 1099 
(Utah 2000). This issue was preserved on appeal by the Defendants at the September 13, 
2005 hearing before the trial court. (R. at 371, Tr. p.101.) 
1
 Citation conventions in this brief are as follows: "Br." refers to Plaintiffs' 
Opening Brief, "Add. Ex." refers to an exhibit in the Plaintiffs' Addendum, "Tr." refers 
to the transcript of hearings for February 22, 2005, August 17, 2005, August 24, 2005, 
September 13, 2005, and October 14, 2005, and "R." refers to the record on appeal. 
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2. Do six days of evidentiary hearings and one day of oral arguments before an 
arbitrator followed by four separate hearings before the trial court regarding an 
arbitrator's award constitute an "independent judicial determination" for purposes of 
sections 48-2c-710(3) and 482c-809 of the Utah Revised Limited Liability Act? 
This Court reviews the trial court's interpretation of a statutory provision for 
correctness. Davis Countv Sold Waste Mgmt. v. Citv of Bountiful 52 P.3d 1174, 1176 
(Utah 2002). 
3. Did the trial court violate the due process and open courts clause of the Utah 
Constitution by conducting an independent review of an arbitrator's award after the Way 
Cool Dirt Cheap, LLC's Amended and Restated Operating Agreement expressly provided 
in writing that any controversy or claim arising between the members regarding the 
operation of the company or relating to the Operating Agreement would be resolved 
through arbitration? 
Defendants contend that this Court should not consider Plaintiffs' second issue on 
appeal where Plaintiffs have failed to comply with Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 
24(a)(5)(A) by including a citation to the record showing where their second issue on 
appeal was preserved in the trial court. 
Nevertheless, if this Court elects to review this issue on appeal this Court grants no 
deference to the trial court's legal conclusions in interpreting a statute. Grvnberg v. 
Ouestar Pipeline Co., 70 P.3d 1 (Utah 2003). 
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4. Does an arbitrator's eight page award which included an introduction, 
description of the award, the arbitrator's written comments, and a conclusion 
accompanied by the arbitrator's signature satisfy the Utah Arbitration Act's requirement 
that an arbitrator "make a record" of an award? 
Defendants contend that Plaintiffs' third issue on appeal regarding their contention 
that the trial court erred by confirming the arbitrator's award where the arbitrator failed 
"to make a record" should not be addressed by this Court where Defendants have failed to 
preserve this issue for appellate review. In Spears v. Warr, 44 P.3d 742 (Utah 
2000)(rev'd on other grounds), this Court held that it will not address an issue on appeal 
if that issue was not adequately preserved for appeal. To properly preserve an issue for 
appeal, "the trial court must be offered an opportunity to rule on an issue." Id. at 748 
quoting Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998)(citations omitted). 
Defendants contend that Plaintiffs have failed to preserve their third issue on 
appeal where their argument regarding the failure of the arbitrator to make a record was 
never brought before the trial court, and subsequently, the trial court was never offered 
the opportunity to rule on the issue. The record is devoid of any reference to this 
argument in the trial court, and consequently, Plaintiffs have failed to comply with Utah 
Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(5)(A). Accordingly, Defendants respectfully ask this 
Court to disregard Plaintiffs' third issue on appeal where it has not been properly 
preserved. 
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5. Did the trial court properly deny the Plaintiffs' request for attorneys fees, 
costs, and interest pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-3 la-126(3) where the arbitrator's award 
named the Defendants as the "prevailing party" for purposes of the arbitration? 
Defendants contend that this Court should not consider Plaintiffs' fourth issue on 
appeal regarding attorneys fees where Plaintiffs have failed to comply with Utah Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 24(a)(5)(A) by including a citation to the record showing where this 
issue was preserved in the trial court. 
Nevertheless, if this Court elects to review this issue on appeal this Court grants no 
deference to the trial court's legal conclusions in interpreting a statute. Grvnberg v. 
Ouestar Pipeline Co., 70 P.3d 1 (Utah 2003). 
STATEMENT OF DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Defendants adopt the constitutional provisions, statutes and rules of central 
importance to this appeal as set forth in the Plaintiffs' brief. (Br. at 3-5.) However, 
Defendants include the following additional statutes which the Plaintiffs have omitted and 
which are of central importance to this appeal: 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-31 A-14(l). Vacation of the award by court. 
(1) Upon motion to the court by any party to the arbitration proceeding for 
vacation of the award, the court shall vacate the award if it appears: 
(a) the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue 
means; 
(b) an arbitrator, appointed as a neutral, showed partiality, or an 
arbitrator was guilty of misconduct that prejudiced the rights of any 
party; 
(c) the arbitrators exceeded their powers; 
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(d) the arbitrators refused to postpone the hearing upon sufficient 
cause shown, refused to hear evidence material to the controversy, or 
otherwise conducted the hearing to the substantial prejudice of the 
rights of a party; or 
(e) there was no arbitration agreement between the parties to the 
arbitration proceeding. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-31a-122(3). Remedies - Fees and expenses of arbitration 
proceeding. 
(3) As to all remedies other than those authorized by Subsections (1) and 
(2), an arbitrator may order any remedies as the arbitrator considers just and 
appropriate under the circumstances of the arbitration proceeding. The fact 
that a remedy could not or would not be granted by the court is not a ground 
for refusing to confirm an award under Section 78-3 la-123 or for vacating 
an award under Section 78-31a-124. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-31a-123. Confirmation of award. 
After a party to an arbitration proceeding receives notice of an award, the 
party may make a motion to the court for an order confirming the award at 
which time the court shall issue a confirming order unless the award is 
modified or corrected pursuant to Section 78-3 la-121 or 78-3 la-125 or is 
vacated pursuant to Section 78-3 la-124. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case. 
This case concerns the Plaintiffs' expulsion as members of the Way Cool Dirt 
Cheap, LLC ("WCDC") after an arbitrator concluded that the Plaintiffs' had breached 
WCDC's Amended and Restated Operating Agreement (the "Operating Agreement") 
through the misappropriation and conversion of WCDC's assets. The central issue on 
appeal is whether the trial court properly confirmed the arbitrator's award which removed 
the Defendants as members of WCDC after the arbitrator heard six days of evidentiary 
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hearings and one day of oral argument and where the trial court conducted four hearings 
regarding the arbitrator's award before ultimately confirming it. 
II. Course of Proceedings. 
On May 24, 2004, after unsuccessful attempts by the Defendants to resolve a 
dispute with the Plaintiffs regarding the operation of WCDC through negotiations or 
mediation, the Defendants notified the Plaintiffs of their intent to submit their dispute to 
arbitration pursuant to the terms of the Operating Agreement. (R. at 91.) 
On November 30, 2004, Plaintiffs filed a complaint seeking an injunction which 
would enjoin the parties from proceeding with the arbitration. (R. at 11.) On December 
17, 2004, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment seeking dismissal of the 
Plaintiffs' complaint where WCDC's Operating Agreement specifically mandated that 
any dispute not settled through negotiation or mediation be submitted for arbitration, and 
where the conditions precedent to an arbitration had been satisfied. (R. at 24-26.) On 
February 23, 2005, Judge Bruce C. Lubeck issued a ruling granting Defendants' Motion 
for Summary Judgment and ordered the Plaintiffs to submit to arbitration. (R. at 143.) 
After various complaints by the Plaintiffs regarding who would serve as the 
arbitrator, the parties eventually agreed on Kent B. Scott (the "Arbitrator"). The 
Arbitrator conducted a thorough arbitration which consisted of six days of evidentiary 
hearings held on June 13 and 14, and July 21, 22, 23, and 24, 2005, followed by oral 
arguments heard on July 29, 2005. (Add. Ex. 2, R. at 266.) At each of these hearings the 
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Plaintiffs were afforded the full opportunity to advocate their case through the 
presentation of testimony, examination of witnesses, and submission of evidence. 
After receiving all of the parties' evidence, the Arbitrator issued his Award on 
August 11, 2005, which among other things, expelled the Plaintiffs as members of 
WCDC and found that Plaintiffs had converted the "inventory, accounts, equipment, 
name, good will, the St. George store leasehold interest, trade fixtures, and other assets of 
WCDC when they created the Original Way Cool Dirt Cheap ("OWCDC") and used 
those assets in the OWCDC operations." (Add. Ex. 2, R. at 266-267.) The Award also 
ordered the Plaintiffs to return the assets listed above "to WCDC forthwith as of the date 
of this award." (Add. Ex. 2, R. at 266-267.) 
On August 16, 2005, Defendants filed a Motion for Order Confirming Arbitration 
Award and for Judgment Conforming to the Award with the trial court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 78-31a-123 and 78-3 la-126(1). (R. at 188-189.) § 78-31a-123 provides in 
part that "[a]fter a party to an arbitration proceeding receives notice of an award, the party 
may make a motion for an order confirming the award at which time the court shall issue 
a confirming order . . . . " Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-123. While § 78-31a-126(l) 
provides that "[u]pon granting an order confirming . . . an award, the court shall enter a 
judgment conforming to the award. The judgment may be recorded, docketed and 
enforced as any other judgment in a civil case." Utah Code. Ann. § 78-31a-126(l). 
7 
On August 17, 2005, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Vacate Arbitrator's Award in 
which they argued that the Arbitrator had exceeded his authority by expelling the 
Plaintiffs from WCDC. (R. at 210-212.) 
On October 14, 2005, Judge Kennedy conducted a hearing on the Defendants' 
Motion for Order Confirming Arbitration Award and for Judgment Conforming to the 
Award and the Plaintiffs' Motion to Vacate Arbitrator's Award. (R. at 371, Tr. p. 156.) 
III. Disposition in Court Below. 
On October 14, 2005, the trial court issued an Order Confirming Arbitration 
Award and a Judgment Conforming to Arbitration Award. (R. at 263; 274.) The trial 
court confirmed the Award pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-3 la-123 and 78-3 la-126 
and held that its judgment conforming to the Award could be "recorded, docketed and 
enforced as any other judgment in a civil case." (R. at 264.) The trial court incorporated 
the Arbitrator's Award in full. (R. at 266; 275.) 
IV. Statement of Facts 
A. The Operating Agreement's Arbitration Provision 
On or about July 18, 2003, R. Graham, D. Graham, Duke and Cardenas each 
signed WCDC's Operating Agreement. (Add. Ex. 1, R. at.225.) The particular provision 
of the Operating Agreement at issue in this case, Paragraph 8.3, provides: 
(a) In General. Assuming the inability of the Member to resolve their 
differences as provided in paragraphs 8.1 and 8.2, the controversy or 
claim arising out of or relating to this Agreement or any agreement 
or document in connection therewith (including any question arising 
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under paragraph 3.5(c) and questions as to whether or not any 
dispute falls within the terms of this paragraph or the selection or 
arbitrators) shall be settled by arbitration in Salt Lake City, Utah . . . 
The arbitration procedure shall be governed by the United States 
Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-6, and the award rendered by the 
arbitrator shall be final and binding on the parties and may be 
entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof.2 
(Add. Ex. 1, R. at 240.) It is undisputed that Plaintiffs and Defendants signed the 
Operating Agreement and thereby agreed to comply with its terms. (Add. Ex. 1, R. at 
242.) 
B. The Arbitration Proceeding and Award 
Prior to October, 2003, a dispute arose among the members of WCDC relating to 
the operation of WCDC's two stores in Draper and Santa Clara, Utah. (R. at 139.) 
Pursuant to the terms of the Operating Agreement, the matter was submitted for 
arbitration.3 (Add. Ex. 1, R. at 240.) 
After the trial court ordered the Plaintiffs to submit to arbitration, the arbitration 
proceeding began with six full days of evidentiary hearings on June 13, 14 and July 21, 
2
 While the Arbitration Provision requires application of the United States 
Arbitration Act to govern any arbitration, the Utah Uniform Arbitration Act (the "Utah 
Arbitration Act") mirrors its federal counterpart and is applicable in this case. 
Accordingly, Defendants' inclusion of case law interpreting the United States Arbitration 
Act is germane to the interpretation of the Utah Arbitration Act. 
3
 Prior to initiating the arbitration process, Defendants complied with the Operating 
Agreement's requirement that the parties attempt to resolve the dispute through 
negotiation or mediation. (Add. Ex. 1, R. at 240.) However, despite Defendants' 
repeated attempts to facilitate a resolution through negotiation or mediation, the Plaintiffs 
repeatedly refused to make a good faith effort to resolve the dispute prior to arbitration. 
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22, 23, 24 and 29th, during which both Plaintiffs and Defendants were allowed to present 
extensive and exhaustive evidence related to the parties' dispute. (Add. Ex. 2, PL. at 266.) 
The Arbitrator also conducted oral arguments on the matter on July 29, 2005 wherein the 
Plaintiffs were permitted to present their legal and factual arguments. (Add. Ex. 2, R. at 
266.) Following the hearings, the Arbitrator took the matter under advisement, and on 
October 14, 2005 issued his Award. 
The Award expelled Plaintiffs as members of WCDC "by virtue of section 48-2c-
710 (3)(1) and (c) UCA." (Add Ex. 2, R. at 266.) The Award also held that: 
5. Duke and Zavala converted the inventory, accounts, equipment, name, 
good will, the St. George leasehold interest, trade fixtures and other assets 
of WCDC when they created [OWCDC] and used those assets in the 
OWCDC operations. Duke and Zavala are ordered to return the same to 
WCDC forthwith as of the date of this award. 
6. Duke and Zavala, by creating and operating OWCDC are in violation of 
paragraph 3.9 of the Operating Agreement. The terms of paragraph 3.9 of 
the Operating Agreement are modified to reduce the geographical area of 
non-competition from that of the Western United States to Utah . . . . 
8. R. Graham and D. Graham are the prevailing parties in this action 
concerning their claims for Breach of the Operating Agreement, 
Conversion, Breach of Fiduciary Duty and Expulsion. . . 
(Add. Ex. 2, R. at 267.) 
The Arbitrator's Award was eight pages long and was comprised of an introduction, a 
nine paragraph section detailing the Arbitrator's award, six pages of the Arbitrator's 
written comments, and a conclusion accompanied by the Arbitrator's signature. 
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C. Trial Court's Review of the Arbitrator's Award 
On four separate occasions the trial court in this case conducted hearings regarding 
the Arbitrator's Award which was issued August 14, 2005. (R. at 371.) On August 17, 
2005, the trial court conducted a hearing on the Defendants' Motion for a Temporary 
Restraining Order seeking to enforce the terms of the Arbitrator's Award. (R. at 371, Tr. 
p. 16.) The court heard extensive evidence from the Defendants regarding the refusal of 
the Plaintiffs to comply with the express terms of the Award, including the mandate to 
return the property of WCDC which Plaintiffs had misappropriated. (R. at 371, Tr. p.36.) 
On August 24, 2005, the court conducted a hearing on the Defendants' Motion for 
a Preliminary Injunction. (R. at 371, Tr. p.38.) At that hearing, the court again heard 
evidence, in the form of witness testimony, relating to the Plaintiffs' failure to comply 
with the terms of the Arbitrator's Award. On September 13, 2005, the court again heard 
witness testimony and oral arguments related to the Plaintiffs' failure to comply with the 
Award. (R. at 371, Tr. p.97.) Finally, on October 14, 2005, the trial court heard oral 
arguments regarding the Defendants' Motion for Order Confirming Arbitration Award 
and the Plaintiffs' Motion to Vacate Arbitrator's Award. (R. at 371, Tr. p. 156.). At that 
hearing, the Defendants' sought confirmation of the Award pursuant to the Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-3 la-123 and the Plaintiffs' sought vacation of the Award on the grounds that 
the Arbitrator exceeded his authority in expelling Duke and Cardenas from WCDC. (R. 
at 371.) The trial court took the matter under advisement, and that same day, issued its 
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Order Confirming Arbitrator's Award and Judgment Conforming to Arbitrator's Award. 
(R. at 264; 274.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The central issue in this appeal is straightforward: did the trial court correctly 
confirm the Arbitrator's Award which expelled the Defendants as members of WCDC? 
Defendants contend that the trial court properly confirmed the Arbitrator's Award where 
a trial court's standard of review when reviewing an arbitrator's award is an extremely 
narrow one which gives considerable leeway to the arbitrator and only allows for the 
setting aside of an arbitrator's decision in certain limited circumstances, none of which 
were present in this case. See Softsolutions. Inc. v Brigham Young Univ.. 1 P.3d 1095 
(Utah 2000). 
Defendants also contend that seven days of hearings before the Arbitrator wherein 
the Plaintiffs called witnesses, cross-examined witnesses, and submitted documentary 
evidence constituted a "judicial determination" made by a "court" for purposes of the 
Utah Revised Limited Liability Company Act (the "LLC Act"). However, even if this 
Court were to determine that the arbitration proceeding did not constitute a "judicial 
determination" made by a "court," Defendants contend that the trial court's review of the 
Arbitrator's Award through four separate hearings qualifies as a "judicial determination." 
Additionally, the trial court's confirmation of the Arbitrator's Award did not 
violate the Plaintiffs' right to a "day in court" pursuant to either the due process or open 
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courts clause of the Utah Constitution. This Court has explicitly held that the Utah 
Arbitration Act does not violate a party's due process or open courts rights where that 
party has expressly and unequivocally agreed to resolve any and all disputes through 
arbitration, thereby waiving their constitutional right to judicial resolution of their 
disputes. See Miller v. USAA Cas.Ins. Co.. 44 P.3d 663 (Utah 2002). 
In this case, it is undisputed that Plaintiffs agreed to submit any and all disputes 
related to the Operating Agreement or the operation of WCDC to arbitration, and 
consequently, they have expressly and unequivocally waived their right to a "day in 
court" pursuant to either the due process or open courts clause of the Utah Constitution. 
Defendants also contend that this Court should not consider Plaintiffs' third issue 
on appeal where the Plaintiffs have failed to preserve it on appeal. However, in the event 
this Court elects to consider this issue, the trial court did not err by confirming the 
Arbitrator's Award where the Arbitrator's eight-page Award detailing the award being 
granted, and including six-pages of the Arbitrator's written comments setting forth the 
basis for the Arbitrator's Award, constitutes a "record" for purposes of Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2 la-120. 
Finally, the trial court properly awarded attorneys fees, costs, and interest to the 
Defendants as the "prevailing party" pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 la-126(3). It is 
undisputed that the Defendants were named the "prevailing party" by the Arbitrator, and 
therefore they were entitled to their attorneys fees, costs, and interest. Moreover, 
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pursuant to § 78-3 la-126(3), Defendants are entitled to all attorneys fees, costs, and 
interest incurred in defending the trial court's confirmation of the Arbitrator's Award. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Trial Court Correctly Confirmed The Arbitrator's Award Where The 
Standard Of Review When Reviewing An Arbitrator's Decision Is An 
Extremely Narrow One And Where None Of The Circumstances Which 
Would Justify Vacating The Award Were Present, 
A. The Law In Utah Imposes An Extremely Narrow Standard Of Review 
When A Trial Court Reviews An Arbitrator's Award. 
In Utah, the policy of law favors arbitration as a speedy and inexpensive method of 
adjudicating disputes. DeVore v. IHC Hospitals. Inc.. 884 P.2d 1246, 1251 (Utah 1994) 
citing Utility Trailer Sales of Salt Lake City. Inc. v. Fake. 740 P.2d 1327, 1329 (Utah 
1987). Pursuant to this policy, this Court has held that "judicial review of arbitration 
awards should not be pervasive in scope or encourage repetitive adjudications" and that 
as a general rule an arbitration award will not be disturbed because the court does not 
agree with the award so long as the proceeding was fair and honest and the substantial 
rights of the parties were respected. Id. 
This Court further elaborated on this standard when it held that "the standard of 
review for a trial court is an extremely narrow one giving considerable leeway to the 
arbitrator and setting aside the arbitrator's decisions only in certain narrow 
circumstances." Softsolutions. Inc.. 1 P.3d at 1099. This Court continued, "[t]he trial 
court may not substitute its judgment for that of the arbitrator, nor may it modify or vacate 
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an award because it disagrees with the arbitrator's assessment."4 Id. quoting Buzas 
Baseball Inc. v. Salt Lake Trappers, Inc., 925 P.2d 941, 947-948 (Utah 1996). 
This Court has been clear that given the strong policy favoring arbitration as a fast 
and inexpensive alternative of adjudicating disputes, a trial court must apply a very strict 
standard of review when asked to modify or vacate an arbitrator's award. A trial court is 
not permitted to conduct a de novo review of the facts and law upon which the arbitrator 
relied, nor is the trial court permitted to vacate or modify an arbitrator's award simply 
because it disagrees with the arbitrator's result. Moreover, a trial court can not vacate or 
modify an arbitrator's award even if the court found there were errors in either the 
arbitrator's factual findings or his interpretation of the law. Denver & Rio Grande 
Western R.R. Co v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 119 F.3d 847, 849 (10th Cir. 1997). Nor 
does an insufficiency of evidence supporting the award permit a court to disturb the 
arbitrator's award. Elier Mfg., Inc. v. Kowing Dev. Corp., 14 F.3d 1250, 1254 (7th Cir. 
1994). When reviewing an arbitrator's award, a trial court is limited to examining 
4
 The Seventh Circuit has defined the standard of review this way: 
Our scope of review of a commercial arbitration award is grudgingly 
narrow .. . Errors in the arbitrator's interpretation of law or findings of fact 
do not merit reversal under this standard . . . [n]or does an insufficiency of 
evidence supporting the decision permit us to disturb the arbitrator's order. 
Arbitration does not provide a system of "junior varsity trial courts" 
offering the losing party complete and rigorous de novo review. 
Elier Mfg., Inc., 14 F.3d at 1253-1254. 
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whether the arbitration was fair and honest and respected the rights of the parties to 
present their case before the arbitrator. See DeVore, 884 P.2d at 1251. 
In this case, the trial court correctly applied this strict standard when it reviewed 
the Arbitrator's Award. Plaintiffs dedicate a substantial portion of their brief to arguing 
that the trial court's confirmation of the Award was erroneous where the court did not 
conduct a full scale judicial proceeding on the merits of the case and where the court 
allegedly "rubber stamped" the Arbitrator's Award. (Br. at 6, 19, 20.) However, 
Plaintiffs' request for a de novo review based on the Plaintiffs' contention of errors in fact 
or law in the Arbitrator's Award is exactly the type of "repetitive adjudication" this Court 
has sought to discourage by imposing a stringent standard of review. 
The trial court's confirmation of the Arbitrator's Award was not simply a 
nonchalant "rubber stamping" of the Award, but reflects the implementation of the proper 
standard of review a trial court must apply when reviewing such an award. In this case, 
the trial court did not address the substantive issues regarding the parties' dispute, nor did 
it engage in "repetitive adjudications," by substituting its own judgment for that of the 
Arbitrator. In short, the trial court properly reviewed the Arbitrator's Award and 
confirmed it pursuant to the proper standard of review. 
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B. None Of The Arbitration Act's Five Circumstances Permitting The 
Trial Court To Vacate Or Otherwise Modify The Arbitrator's Award 
Were Present In This Case. 
The Utah Arbitration Act sets forth five limited circumstances under which an 
arbitrator's award may be vacated: (1) the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or 
other undue means; (2) the arbitrator showed partiality, or was guilty of misconduct that 
prejudiced the rights of any party; (3) the arbitrator exceeded his power; (4) the arbitrator 
refused to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause shown, refused to hear evidence 
material to the controversy, or otherwise conducted the hearing to the substantial 
prejudice of the rights of a party; or (5) there was no arbitration agreement between the 
parties to the arbitration proceeding. Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-14(l)(a)-(3).5 Plaintiffs 
argue that the Arbitrator's Award should be vacated pursuant to the third circumstance.6 
Their argument should be rejected. 
This Court has held that when an award is challenged on the basis that the 
arbitrator exceeded his authority, a court applies a two-pronged test: (1) the court must 
5
 The United States Arbitration Act contains language nearly identical to that of the 
Utah Arbitration Act. The federal Act states that an order can be made to vacate an 
award: 
(4) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed 
them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter 
submitted was not made. 
9U.S.C. § 10(a)(4). 
6
 Plaintiffs have not alleged that any of the other four circumstances for vacating or 
modifying an arbitrator's award is present in this case. Accordingly, Defendants have not 
addressed the other four issues. 
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review the submission agreement and determine whether the arbitrator's award covers 
areas not contemplated by the agreement, or (2) determine that an award is without 
foundation in reason or fact. Softsolutions. Inc.. 1 P.3d at 1100 (citations omitted). 
Defendants contend that in this case neither of these prongs are satisfied, and accordingly, 
the trial court properly confirmed the Award. 
1. The Arbitrator's Award only resolved questions within the 
jurisdictional boundary of the Operating Agreement. 
In this case the Arbitrator did not exceed his authority where he stayed within the 
jurisdictional boundary of the Operating Agreement. This Court has held that the 
arbitration agreement itself defines the scope of the controversy to be arbitrated." Miller. 
44 P.3d at 673. For a court to hold that an arbitrator has exceeded his authority, a court 
must determine that the arbitrator's award covers areas not contemplated by the 
submission agreement. Pacific Dev.. L.C. v. Orton. 23 P.3d 1035, 1038 (Utah 2001). 
In Pacific, a dispute arose between Pacific and Orton for work Orton had 
performed on two plats designated as Plat B and Plat C. Id. at 1036. The parties 
executed a written agreement to arbitrate their dispute which stated that all issues relating 
to Plat B had been resolved and "therefore, the arbitration will focus on the remaining 
issues of the dispute, those which relate to Plat C, thereby resolving all remaining issues 
in the case." Id. at 1037. However, when the arbitrator returned his award, he had 
rendered a decision with respect to both Plat B and Plat C. Id. Orton sought confirmation 
of the arbitrator's award in the district court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 la-12 
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while Pacific responded by filing a motion to vacate or modify the award based on 
Pacific's contention that the arbitrator had exceeded his authority by purporting to resolve 
issues related to Plat B in the award. Id. The district court rejected Pacific's motion and 
the court of appeals affirmed. Id. 
However, on appeal, this Court reversed the trial court. This Court noted that the 
parties' written agreement clearly provided that the only issue submitted for arbitration 
related to Plat C, and therefore, the only reasonable interpretation of the agreement is that 
any issues related to Plat B would not be submitted for resolution by the arbitrator. Id. at 
1038. This Court noted that the "written agreement defines the scope of the arbitrator's 
authority" and that an arbitrator exceeds his authority when his award covers areas not 
contemplated by the submission agreement. Id. This Court held that where the parties 
had not expressly modified their submission agreement to include the arbitration of issues 
related to Plat B, the arbitrator had exceeded his authority and the award should be 
vacated. Id. 
In this case, the question then becomes: did the Arbitrator's Award purport to 
resolve questions that the Arbitrator was not permitted to address pursuant to the express 
terms of the Operating Agreement? If so, it may be argued the Arbitrator exceeded his 
authority. However, the evidence in this case clearly shows that the Arbitrator only 
purported to resolve issues that were properly within the jurisdictional boundaries set 
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forth in WCDC's Operating Agreement, and therefore the Arbitrator did not exceed his 
authority. 
WCDC's Operating Agreement expressly defined the scope of the Arbitrator's 
authority as any "dispute among the Members arising out of or relating to this Agreement 
or to the operation of the Company." (Add. Ex. 1, R. at 240.) Unlike Pacific, the 
Operating Agreement did not designate a narrow issue for the Arbitrator's attention, but 
instead, established very wide "jurisdictional boundaries" which encompassed any dispute 
among the parties "arising out of or relating to this Agreement or to the operation of the 
Company." (Add. Ex. 1, R. at 240.) 
The questions which were ultimately submitted to the Arbitrator in this case dealt 
with the parties' dispute regarding the operation of WCDC and the Plaintiffs' breach of 
the Operating Agreement, issues which were both squarely within the jurisdictional 
boundary of the Arbitrator given their relation to the operation of the Company and the 
terms of the Operating Agreement (Add. Ex. 1, R. at 240) The Arbitrator's Award only 
resolved the specific issues submitted to the Arbitrator and did not purport to resolve 
issues that were either not submitted to the Arbitrator or that were not within his purview 
authority. Accordingly, the Arbitrator did not exceed his authority in issuing the Award. 
2. The Arbitrator's Award was not without foundation in reason 
or/act. 
If an award is without foundation in reason or fact the arbitrator may be found to 
have exceeded his authority. Buzas Baseball Inc., 925 P.2d at 950. This test has 
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sometimes been referred to as the "irrationality principle," based on the assumption that if 
the parties have waived their right to submit their dispute to formal litigation, the 
arbitrator must decide the dispute on a rational basis. Id. citing Swift Indus., Inc. v. 
Botany Indus.. Inc.. 466 F.2d 1125, 1131 (3d Cir. 1972). However, this Court cautioned 
that the "irrationality principle" must be "applied with a view to the narrow scope of 
review in arbitration cases." Id. 
In Buzas, this Court held that an arbitrator's award was rational where the only 
basis for invalidating the award was if all of the evidence would have contradicted the 
arbitrator's award. Id. 
In this case, the Arbitrator's Award was clearly rational and supported by reason, 
fact, and law. The Arbitrator received copious amounts of evidence establishing the 
Plaintiffs' misappropriation and conversion of WCDC assets in breach of the Operating 
Agreement. Defendants contend that not only was the Arbitrator's Award rational, but 
that it was the only possible result given the evidence presented. Accordingly, the 
Arbitrator did not exceed his authority where the Award was supported by reason, fact, 
and law. 
In conclusion, the Arbitrator did not exceed his authority in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-3 la-14(1 )(c) where his Award only purported to resolve issues which were 
squarely within the jurisdictional boundaries established by the Operating Agreement and 
where the Arbitrator's Award was supported by reason, fact, and law. 
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C The Arbitrator Did Not Exceed His Authority Where the Utah 
Arbitration Act Authorizes The Arbitrator to Order Any 
Remedy He Considered Appropriate In This Case. 
The Arbitrator did not exceed his authority by expelling Duke and Cardenas as 
members of WCDC, and Duke as a manger of WCDC, where the Utah Arbitration Act 
grants an arbitrator the authority to dispense any remedy he deemed appropriate. In 
enumerating the remedies available to an arbitrator, the Utah Arbitration Act provides, 
"an arbitrator may order any remedies as the arbitrator considers just and appropriate 
under the circumstances of the arbitration proceeding. The fact that a remedy could not 
or would not be granted by the court is not a ground for refusing to confirm an award.. . 
or for vacating an award" Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 la-122(3) (emphasis added). 
In this case, the Plaintiffs urge this Court to reverse the trial court's confirmation 
of the Award on the grounds that the Arbitrator exceeded his authority by expelling Duke 
and Cardenas as members of WCDC, and Duke as a manager of WCDC, where the LLC 
Act provides that members are to be removed by "judicial determination" and a manager 
by a "court" (Br. at 17-18.) However, Plaintiffs fail to recognize that where the parties' 
dispute was submitted for arbitration as required by the Operating Agreement, the Utah 
Arbitration Act controls in this case, not the LLC Act. Accordingly, the Utah Arbtiration 
Act granted broad discretion to the Arbitrator to elect any remedy he deemed appropriate, 
even if that remedy could not have been issued by the trial court. 
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In this case, the Arbitrator correctly believed that expulsion of the Defendants 
from WCDC was the appropriate remedy considering their pilfering and conversion of 
WCDC's assets and breach of the Operating Agreement. The Arbitrator's Award was not 
only within the boundaries of the authority granted him by the terms of the Operating 
Agreement, but was also supported by reason, fact, and law. Moreover, the expulsion of 
the Defendants from WCDC was an appropriate remedy pursuant to the Utah Arbitration 
Act and was properly confirmed by the trial court. 
II. Seven Days Of Hearings Before the Arbitrator Followed By Four Hearing In 
The Trial Court Regarding The Arbitrator's Award Constitutes A "Judicial 
Determination" For Purposes Of The LLC Act. 
A. The Arbitration Served As A "Judicial Determination" For Purposes 
Of Sections 48-2C-710(3) And 48-2c-809 Of The LLC Act. 
The arbitration of the parties' dispute in this case constituted a "judicial 
determination" for purposes of the LLC Act. Utah Code Ann. § 48-2C-710(3) provides 
in relevant part that a member of a company may be expelled: 
(3) on application by the company or another member, by judicial 
determination that the member: 
(a) has engaged in wrongful conduct that adversely and materially 
affected the company's business; 
(b) has wilfully or persistently committed a material breach of the 
articles of incorporation or operating agreement or of a duty owed to 
the company or to the other members under Section 48-2C-807; or 
(c) has engaged in conduct relating to the company's business which 
makes it not reasonably practicable to carry on the business with the 
member. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 48-2C-710(3). With respect to the removal of a manager of a company 
the LLC Act provides in relevant part that: 
(1) The district court. . . may remove a manager . . . in a proceeding . . . if 
the court finds that: 
(a) the manager engaged in fraudulent or dishonest conduct or gross 
abuse of authority or discretion with respect to the company; and 
(b) removal is in the best interests of the company. 
Utah Code Ann. § 48-2C-809(l)(a)-(b). 
In this case, an arbitration consisting of six days of evidentiary hearings and one 
day of oral arguments constituted a "judicial determination" by a "court" for purposes of 
the LLC Act. Furthermore, Plaintiffs contend that where the Defendants expressly and 
unequivocally entered into the Operating Agreement which contained a mandatory 
Arbitration provision, that the Defendants waived their right to judicial resolution of their 
dispute in the trial court and accepted the arbitration in its place. See McCoy v. Blue 
Cross & Blue Shield of Utah. 20 P.3d 901, 904 (Utah 2001). 
Plaintiffs repeatedly cite this Court's decision in CCD, L.C. v. Millsap. ] 16 P.3d 
366 (Utah 2005), in support of their contention that only a trial court can expel a member 
or manager of an LLC. However, CCD actually contradicts the Plaintiffs' argument and 
supports the trial court's confirmation of the Arbitrator's Award. 
In CCD, a limited liability title company, CCD, brought an action to expel a 
member, Millsap, who had repeatedly misappropriated funds from CCD's trust account 
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for his own use. Id. at 368. Millsap argued that according to CCD's operating 
agreement, which provided that only members could be expelled, he could not be 
expelled by CCD where he was no longer a member having fulfilled the requirements for 
retiring. Id. 
On appeal, this Court rejected Millsap's "Aristotelian logic" and held that the LLC 
Act's expulsion provisions trumped an operating agreement which set forth expulsion 
rules that varied from those of the LLC Act. Id. at 372. This Court held that the LLC 
Act's statutory expulsion provisions "must be preserved against erosion through the terms 
of operating agreements." Id- Therefore, this Court rejected Millsap's reading of the 
operating agreement and required that he be subject to the expulsion provisions of the 
LLC Act so that a judicial determination could be held to determine whether his acts 
warranted expulsion. Id. 
At first blush, CCD seems directly analogous to the case at hand where the 
relevant issue was the interplay between the expulsion provisions of a company's 
operating agreement and the expulsion requirements of the LLC Act. However, CCD is 
distinguishable from this case in one key area, that case did not involve an arbitration 
provision as part of its operating agreement. 
In CCD, this Court reasoned that the expulsion provisions of the LLC Act trumped 
the expulsion provisions of an operating agreement so as to protect against the possibility 
of a member bargaining away his right to a neutral and unbiased expulsion procedure. 
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This Court noted that, "[t]he requirement that expulsions be made by judicial 
determination affords members like Mr. Millsap, through the intervention of a neutral and 
impartial fact finder, the most reliable safeguard against inequitable treatment available in 
our society." Id. 
This Court decision in CCD did not focus on what constituted a "judicial 
determination" or a "court" for purposes of the LLC Act, but rather, on whether the 
expulsion provisions of a company provide a member with at least the same degree of 
protection against potentially biased expulsion proceedings as the LLC Act does. The 
question of what constitutes a "judicial determination" is not a question of venue but 
rather of procedure. Defendants contend that in this case, the Operating Agreement's 
arbitration provision provided the Plaintiffs with the same degree of protection and 
impartiality as a "judicial proceeding" in a court of law would have provided them, and 
therefore, the arbitration was a "judicial proceeding" for purposes of the LLC Act. 
As stated in CCD, the purpose of the "judicial determination" requirement is to 
afford a party who is facing possible expulsion by her fellow members the benefit of the 
"intervention of a neutral and impartial fact finder" to safeguard her interests, even where 
a company's operating agreement might provide for her expulsion without such a 
mechanism. That purpose was satisfied in this case pursuant to the Operating 
Agreement's arbitration provision which submitted all disputes to the Arbitrator, who by 
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definition is a neutral and impartial fact finder charged with safeguarding the interests of 
the parties to the dispute. 
The Arbitrator in this case collected all the evidence from both parties through 
seven days of hearings just as a trial court would. The Arbitrator then weighed all of the 
evidence and made an unbiased award just as a trial court would. Ultimately, the 
Arbitrator expelled the Plaintiffs for their breach of the Operating Agreement after the 
Arbitrator determined that they had engaged in fraudulent or dishonest conduct that 
materially and adversely affected WCDC's business, just as a trial court would do 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 48-2C-710(3) and 48-2C-809. 
The Defendants were expelled from WCDC pursuant to an arbitration proceeding 
before a neutral and impartial fact finder. Accordingly, the arbitration constituted a 
"judicial proceeding" by a "court" for purposes of the LLC Act and the trial court did not 
did not violate the LLC Act by confirming the Arbitrator's Award.7 
7
 Defendants note that the Utah Arbitration Act was passed by the Utah Legislature 
after the LLC Act and that had the Legislature desired to preclude an arbitrator from 
entertaining disputes related to a limited liability company so as to avoid the possibility of 
expelling a member or manager in supposed contravention of the LLC Act's "judicial 
determination" provisions, it could have expressly subordinated the Utah Arbitration Act 
to the LLC Act and written into the Utah Arbitration Act a provision that arbitrators had 
no authority to arbitrate matters relating to disputes involving members and/or managers 
of a limited liability company. Defendants contend that the absence of such limiting 
language in the Utah Arbitration Act is indicative of Utah's strong policy in favor of 
promoting arbitration as an alternative to trial. 
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B. Four Hearings Before The Trial Court Regarding The 
Arbitrator's Award Constitute A "Judicial Determination" By A 
"Court" For Purposes Of The LLC Act. 
Even if this Court does not deem the arbitration proceeding as a "judicial 
determination" by a "court," the four hearings held before the trial court regarding the 
Award was a "judicial determination" by a "court" for purposes of the LLC Act. 
The record is clear that on August 17, 2005, August 24, 2005, September 13, 2005, 
and October 14, 2005, the trial court heard oral arguments regarding the Plaintiffs' non-
compliance with the Award. (R. at 371.) At each of these hearings the trial court had 
reviewed the Arbitrator's Award and if it harbored any misgivings regarding the validity 
or appropriateness of the Award, the court could have easily modified or vacated the 
Award of its own accord at any of these hearings. However, as briefed earlier, the trial 
court labored under an extremely narrow scope of review and correctly confirmed the 
Arbitrator's Award following the October 14, 2005 hearing. Accordingly, Defendants 
contend that the four hearings held after the Award was issued constitute a "judicial 
determination" by a "court" for purposes of the LLC Act. 
III. The Trial Court Did Not Violate The Due Process And Open Courts 
Provisions Of The Utah Constitution Where The Plaintiffs Expressly Agreed 
In Writing To Submit Any Dispute Between The Parties To Arbitration. 
The trial court did not violate the Plaintiffs' right to a "day in court" by confirming 
the Arbitrator's Award where the Plaintiffs expressly and unequivocally waived their 
right to have their dispute resolved in court. In Lindon City v. Egineers Constr. Co., 636 
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P.2d 1070,1074 (Utah 1981), this Court held that the Utah Arbitration Act violates 
neither Article I, Section 7 (the due process clause) nor Article I, Section 11 (the open 
courts clause) of the Utah Constitution. 
With respect to the due process clause, this Court held that due process of law does 
not necessarily require judicial action and that the Utah Arbitration Act more than fulfills 
the due process requirement that "no party can be affected by such action until his legal 
rights have been the subject of an inquiry by a person or body authorized by law to 
determine such rights, of which inquiry the party has due notice, and at which he had an 
opportunity to be heard and to give evidence as to his rights and defenses." Id. quoting 
Christiansen v. Harris. 163 P.2d 314 (Utah 1945). 
With respect to the open courts clause, this Court held that a party may 
"intentionally and knowingly" waive the ordinary and usual remedy of seeking redress of 
a wrong in the district court. Id. However, this Court noted that such waiver must be 
"expressed in the most unequivocal terms." Id. In Jenkins v. Percival 962 P.2d 796, 799 
(Utah 1998), this Court held that a party can waive their right to due course of law 
through the court system if they expressly agree to arbitration. 
In this case, it is undisputed that the Plaintiffs intentionally and knowingly waived 
their right to have their dispute resolved in court when they signed the Operating 
Agreement. (Add. Ex. 1, R. at 242.) Having consented to the Operating Agreement's 
arbitration provision, Plaintiffs surrendered their right to their day in court in exchange 
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for the ease and convenience of arbitration. Defendants contend that the only process due 
to the Plaintiffs was the process afforded them in the arbitration hearing, and that the 
hearing afforded the Plaintiffs every procedural right provided by the Utah Constitution 
where their dispute was the subject of an inquiry by an arbitrator authorized by law to 
resolve the dispute, where the Plaintiffs had prior notice of the arbitration, and where the 
Plaintiffs were given every opportunity by the arbitrator to be heard and present evidence. 
Where the Plaintiffs entered into the Operating Agreement and intentionally and 
knowingly waived their right to have their dispute resolved in court, this Court should 
reject the Plaintiffs' contention that the trial court violated their right to a day in court 
pursuant to either the due process or open courts clause of the Utah Constitution. 
IV. This Court Should Not Consider The Plaintiffs9 Third Issue On Appeal 
Where It Was Not Properly Preserved For Appellate Review. 
The Plaintiffs have failed to properly preserve their third issue on appeal. In 
Spears v. Warn 44 P.3d 742 (Utah 2000)(rev'd on other grounds), this Court held that it 
will not address an issue on appeal if that issue was not adequately preserved for appeal. 
This Court held that to properly preserve an issue for appeal, "the trial court must be 
offered an opportunity to rule on an issue." Id. at 748 quoting Badger v. Brooklyn Canal 
Co., 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998)(citations omitted). 
The Plaintiffs have failed to preserve their third issue on appeal where their 
argument regarding the failure of the arbitrator to make a record was never brought 
before the trial court, and subsequently, the trial court was never offered the opportunity 
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to rule on the issue. Plaintiffs have failed to cite any part of the record which would 
demonstrate that this issue was previously brought before the trial court. Accordingly, 
Defendants respectfully ask this Court to disregard the Defendants' third issue presented 
on appeal where it has not been properly preserved. 
However, if this Court elects to review the Plaintiffs' third issue on appeal, the 
Plaintiffs' argument should be rejected. Plaintiffs' contend that the trial court erred in 
confirming the Arbitrator's Award where the Arbitrator allegedly failed to "make a 
record" as required by Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 la-120(1). While Defendants acknowledge 
that the Utah Arbitration Act requires the arbitrator to "make a record of an award," 
Defendants contend that the Arbitrator's eight page Award which consisted of an 
introduction, detailed break down of the award granted, six pages of written comments, 
and a conclusion accompanied by the Arbitrator's signature constitutes a record of his 
award. 
V. The Trial Court Properly Confirmed The Arbitrator's Award Of Attorneys 
Fees, Costs, And Interest To The Defendants As The Prevailing Party. 
It is undisputed that the Arbitrator's Award named the Defendants the prevailing 
party for purposes of the arbitration. Accordingly, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 la-
126(3) the Defendants were entitled to their attorneys fees and other reasonable expenses. 
Therefore, the trial court did not err by refusing to award the Plaintiffs their attorneys 
fees, costs, and interest. 
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Defendants also contend that pursuant to § 78-3 la-126(3), they are entitled to all 
attorneys fees, costs, and interest incurred in litigating this matter on appeal where the 
Utah Arbitration Act provides that the prevailing party is entitled to its fees and expenses 
"in a judicial proceeding after the award is made to a judgment confirming . . . an award." 
Utah Code. Ann. § 78-31 a-126(3)(emphasis added). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants respectfully ask this Court to affirm the trial 
court's Order Confirming Arbitrator's Award and the Judgment Conforming to 
Arbitration Award. 
DATED this / / ^ d a y of April, 2006. 
WOODBURY & KESLER, P.C. 
David^rWilnanS 
Anthony M»-0rovls 
Attorneys for Defendants 
32 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the \TZ day of April, 2006,1 mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEES postage prepaid, by First-Class U.S. 
Mail to the following: 
John Martinez 
2974 East St. Mary's Circle 
Salt Lake City, UT 84108 
Nick J. Colessides 
446 South 400 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-3325 
iWguV J^MVL 
33 
